The Prevention of Maritime Terrorism : Is today`s maritime security sufficient? by Plöger, Steffi Marianne
  
THE PREVENTION OF MARITIME TERRORISM 
 
Is today’s maritime security sufficient? 
 
 
 
Steffi Marianne Plöger 
Supervisor: Dr. Kaare Bangert,  
University of Tromsø / Wolfson College, Oxford 
 
Deadline for submission: 15.09.2008 
Number of words: 17,970 (max. 18,000) 
10.09.2008 
_____________________________________________________________________
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
Faculty of Law
 I 
Content 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 Motivation 1 
1.2 Issues 2 
1.3 Sources 2 
1.4 Approach 3 
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 5 
2.1 Definitions and distinctions 5 
2.1.1
 
Terrorism 5
 
2.1.2 Maritime terrorism 7 
2.1.3 Overlap between maritime terrorism and piracy 8 
2.2 Relevance of maritime terrorism 10 
2.2.1 Historical review 10 
2.2.2
 
Relevance of maritime terrorism today 14
 
2.3 Main scenarios of maritime terrorism 16 
2.3.1
 
Scenario 1 (the sea as a transport route) 16
 
2.3.2 Scenario 2 (ships being used as weapons against targets at sea or on land) 17 
2.3.3 Scenario 3 (terrorist attacks against objects at sea) 17 
2.3.4 Scenario 4 (weapons of mass destruction or dangerous materials) 18 
3 PREVENTION OF MARITIME TERRORISM 18 
3.1 Change in the legal regime following 9/11/2001 18 
3.2 Risk factor: vessels 20 
3.2.1 Vessel security 20 
3.2.2 Boarding of vessels 26 
 II 
3.3 Risk factor: ports 38 
3.3.1 Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) 39 
3.3.2 Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) 39 
3.3.3
 
Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) 40
 
3.4 Risk factor: containers 40 
3.4.1
 
SAFE Framework 41
 
3.4.2 CSI 42 
3.5 Risk factor: crews 43 
3.5.1 Identification 44 
3.5.2 Background checks 44 
3.5.3
 
Screening of personnel 45
 
3.5.4
 
Shore leave 46
 
3.6 Risk factor: passengers 48 
3.6.1 Cruise ships 48 
3.6.2 Ferries 49 
3.6.3 Legal regime concerning the risk factor “passengers” 50 
4 CONCLUSION 51 
REFERENCES 55 
ABBREVIATIONS A 
 
 1
1 Introduction 
First I would like to explain my motivation for writing a master’s thesis about the 
prevention of maritime terrorism and then I would like to present the main issues, my 
sources and my approach. 
1.1 Motivation  
After having taken courses in Maritime Law and International Public Law at the University 
of Oslo in autumn 2007, I became especially interested in the area of overlap between these 
two subjects. In my opinion one of the most interesting aspects in this area is violence at 
sea. Violence at sea comprises both piracy and maritime terrorism. However, to narrow the 
topic of this thesis I decided to focus on maritime terrorism and its prevention for one 
particular reason: Since 9/11 the international community has been especially aware of a 
new type of terrorist, namely when the person committing the attack knows that he will die 
during the attack. When the main weapon is, for example, a suicide bomb, the traditional 
concepts of law enforcement are no longer effective. If the terrorist dies in the incident 
anyway, (criminal) proceedings after the incident will not prevent him from committing the 
attack. And catching those who are behind those carrying out the attack remains extremely 
difficult and often has little prospect for success. Therefore the aspect of the prevention of 
maritime terrorism is vitally important.  
There is (as far as I have seen) no work that addresses the issue of the prevention of 
maritime terrorism in the way that I want to address it in this thesis – a fact which made 
this topic even more interesting for me to write about. 
While I was doing research for my thesis I noticed that there is not much public awareness 
of maritime terrorism and that it is at the most considered a matter for thrillers and movies. 
It seems that everyone has the image of the collapsing Twin Towers in their head but that 
severe attacks at sea which have already happened are almost forgotten. So I asked myself 
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whether this lack of awareness of terrorist attacks at or from the sea is also reflected in the 
maritime security regulations and whether they are sufficient to prevent maritime terrorism. 
1.2 Issues 
In my opinion there are two means in particular of preventing maritime terrorism: The first 
is to have sufficient security regulations to reduce the vulnerability of the shipping industry 
as a whole, the second is the boarding of vessels to prevent them from being used as a 
means of supplying maritime terrorism or even as a means of committing an attack. In this 
thesis I would like to find out if there is already sufficient regulation to effectively prevent 
maritime terrorism or whether more has to be done to reduce the vulnerability of possible 
targets. 
1.3 Sources 
I will base my thesis most of all on international law. Even though maritime security 
creates an overlap between international and national security1, I will only address the 
international aspect. The most important sources of international law concerning the 
prevention of maritime terrorism are: the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
(ISPS), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the SAFE 
Framework (SAFE), the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic 
(FAL) and the Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention (Revised 2003). In addition to 
that I will mention some relevant UN SC resolutions as well as guidelines or codes of 
conduct. Unfortunately I cannot take into account how the international regulations have 
been implemented or enforced in the different countries.  
Issues of maritime security are very often not regulated by international conventions but by 
bilateral agreements. The United States in particular has often been a pioneer when it 
comes to issues of maritime security. Several US approaches have strong links to the 
prevention of maritime terrorism and have become what could be called “de facto 
                                                 
1
 Lindfors, in: Maritime Security Conference, 35. 
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international” because so many countries have become parties to those initiatives. The US 
strategy for fighting terrorism consists of several interrelated initiatives: the 96-hour 
advance notification of arrival, the 24-hour advance manifest rule concerning cargo, the 
setting up of an automated targeting system, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) for sea 
cargo containers, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) for supply 
chain security of cargo and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) concerning weapons 
of mass destruction. For capacity restrictions I cannot discuss all the aforementioned US 
initiatives in this thesis. In my opinion the most interesting ones for the worldwide fight 
against maritime terrorism are the PSI and the CSI. I will therefore only discuss these two 
and not the other US initiatives. 
However, there is not only growing concern about maritime terrorism in the United States, 
but also in Europe (as shown by several recent conferences2). The EMSA provides the 
European Commission and Member States with technical and scientific assistance in the 
proper development and implementation of EU legislation on maritime security.3 The 
European approach which, unfortunately, can not be discussed in this thesis is most of all 
based on Regulation (EC) No 725/2004, Regulation (EC) No 884/2005 and Directive 
2005/65/EC.  
1.4 Approach 
Before analyzing how to prevent maritime terrorism a definition needs to be provided of 
what it is that is to be prevented, i.e. we need as exact a definition of maritime terrorism as 
possible. I would like to present, in brief, why and in what way the definition of “terrorism” 
(in general) is controversial, before trying to find the best possible definition for 
“terrorism” and finally specifying this definition concerning the maritime aspect of 
terrorism. I will only discuss non-state terrorism in this thesis. Another aspect which should 
be discussed is whether there is an overlap between maritime terrorism and piracy.  
                                                 
2 See e.g.:  Maritime Security – Current Problems in the Baltic Sea. Conference in Cooperation with the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Hamburg, May 9th-11th, 2007; Legal Challenges in Maritime 
Security, The 31st Virginia Law of the Sea Conference, Heidelberg, May 24th-26th, 2007. 
3
 http://www.emsa.eu.int/.   
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Since several terrorist groups are likely to have developed a maritime attack capability, the 
topic of maritime terrorism is of great relevance today. So I would like to present the most 
important incidents of maritime terrorism that have happened in the past. Further I would 
like to explain the most feared scenarios. 
Chapter 3 is the main chapter in the thesis. First of all I will present, in brief, how the main 
legal regime changed in the aftermath of 9/11. Then I will examine the prevention of  
maritime terrorism by dealing with the most relevant “risk factors” of maritime security, 
i.e. the vessels, the ports, the containers, the crews and the passengers. I would like to 
analyze whether the legal regime concerning the risk factors mentioned is sufficient to 
prevent maritime terrorist incidents or whether current regulations need to be improved. 
However, I will not examine the maritime security of drilling platforms or other offshore 
installations.  
Concerning the risk factor “vessels” I will first present regulations on vessel security as 
such and then the legal situation concerning the boarding of vessels to prevent the supply of 
terrorism. However, I will not specifically discuss the threat of maritime terrorism to 
certain types of vessels such as bulk shipments (with LPG and LNG). 
Furthermore, I would like to point out that I will be discussing the prevention of maritime 
terrorism in regard to the law in times of peace or peacebuilding but not in regard to jus in 
bello.4 I will not present the issue of naval forces or a “naval police” to prevent incidents of 
maritime terrorism. 
Finally, I would like to mention that because of capacity restrictions and the complexity of 
the topic it was, unfortunately, not possible to discuss in depth all aspects mentioned in the 
above. I rather tried to give an overview of the current legal regime concerning maritime 
security in this thesis with the aim of pointing out its weaknesses. I would like to 
concentrate on the issues that I needed to leave out here in a doctoral thesis which I plan to 
write in the future. 
                                                 
4
 For the discussion of the legal status of the new security regime see: Bangert in: Conference Maritime 
Security, 164 seq. 
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2 Conceptual framework and contextual background 
I would like to define maritime terrorism and distinguish it from piracy, to present the 
relevance of maritime terrorism and its main scenarios. 
2.1 Definitions and distinctions 
First of all, as a basis for the thesis we need to define the term “maritime terrorism” as 
clearly as possible. The definition of “terrorism” has always been a controversial issue and 
the debate concerning the definition came up anew after 9/11. However, in addition to this 
definition problem, “maritime terrorism” also has to be differentiated and distinguished 
from “piracy”. Since both are elements of “violence at sea” there are several points of 
overlap, but different legal rules are applicable to terrorism and piracy.  
2.1.1 Terrorism  
Even though most people can clearly qualify an act as terrorism when they see it, experts 
have difficulties agreeing on a common definition of terrorism.5 A definition could first not 
be agreed on among the UN states because several Third World countries wanted the so-
called freedom fighters, i.e. groups struggling for the realization of self-determination, to 
be excluded.6 “One man’s ‘freedom fighter‘ is another’s ‘terrorist‘”7 – this statement aptly 
sums up the problematic. The difficulty lay in agreeing under which circumstances the use 
of violence by terrorists could be qualified as legitimate. So UN Member States preferred 
to take a different approach by drawing up conventions which prohibit clearly-specified 
acts. This approach resulted in circumventing an agreement on a general definition of 
terrorism:8 Many international treaties regulate the specific aspects of terrorism (for 
example hijacking or hostage-taking), but none of them as yet contains a general definition 
of terrorism.9 The UN Member States still have no common definition of terrorism and this 
                                                 
5
 Ong, 63. 
6
 Schiller, in: Parritt, Violence, 88 mentioning the “Rainbow Warrior Affair” as an example. 
7
 Beck/Arend, 162; Garmon, 270  
8
 Cassese, 449 seq. with further references. 
9
 The UN Conventions on terrorism can be found here: http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp; see also 
Cisterna in: Conference Maritime Security, 58. 
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has been a major obstacle to the taking of international countermeasures against 
terrorism.10 
However, the League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism of 1937 (which never entered into force) already contained a general definition 
of terrorism in Article 1(2): “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or 
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons 
or the general public”. In my opinion this definition is not very appropriate because it 
defines “terrorism” by using the word “terror”, which is a circularity. Several of the more 
recent definitions retain this circularity.11 
However, we can also find recent definitions which avoid such a circular argument: For 
example, the standard definition used by the FBI in the United States describes terrorism as 
“the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce 
a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives.”12 In my opinion this definition is appropriate in that it both covers 
attacks against civilian and state targets. However, the term “unlawful” in the definition is 
problematical, because it excludes those terrorist acts which are justified. The question of 
justification should in my opinion not be part of the definition itself, but should rather be 
discussed on a later level, i.e. the level of justification.13 My other criticism is that the 
terrorists’ objectives are limited to political and social ones, but that the ideological or 
religious ones are left out (which have gained special importance since the 9/11 incidents). 
My own definition of terrorism is: “the use of force and violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political, social, ideological or religious objectives.” This 
                                                 
10
 UN, Definitions of terrorism. 
11
 See  e.g. the UN GA Res. 49/60 (1994), § 3 of the annexed Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism: “Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror […]” and SC 
Resolution 1566 (2004): “[…] with the purpose to provoke a state of terror […]”. 
12
 For the list of possible definitions (including the definition used by the FBI) see PA Comission. 
13
 German law (particularly criminal law and law of the torts) strictly differenciates between the elements of 
the offence (“Tatbestand”) and the affirmative defence (“Rechtfertigung”), so that an act which can be 
subsumed under the elements of the offence can still be justified on another level for certain reasons. 
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definition emphasizes the fact that the terrorist act goes beyond the immediate act of 
attacking a maritime target and that the objectives are other than financial. Since there is 
still no universally accepted definition of terrorism14, I will use my own definition as the 
basis for my thesis. 
2.1.2 Maritime terrorism 
As terrorism, maritime terrorism (sometimes called “political piracy”15) has no 
internationally accepted definition to date. However, scholars have sometimes chosen to 
employ Art. 3 of the SUA Convention to get approximate to a definition, because this 
provision describes in some detail certain offences against maritime navigation.16 By not 
using the word “terrorism” the drafters clearly avoided tackling the problem of the 
definition.17 In my opinion, this listing of punishable offences does not help us to find an 
appropriate definition, because we have already seen in the above that we need a certain 
motivation underlying the attack for the attack to qualify as terrorism. This motivation is 
not mentioned in Art. 3 SUA.  
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group has 
generated the following definition of maritime terrorism: “[…] the undertaking of terrorist 
acts and activities (1) within the maritime environment, (2) using or against vessels or fixed 
platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, (3) against 
coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or 
cities.”18 This definition again reflects the circularity mentioned in the above, because it 
describes “maritime terrorism” as the “undertaking of terrorist acts”.  
Sometimes “maritime terrorism” is defined as “the use of violence at sea, in territorial 
waters, or against maritime targets by supranational organizations or non-state actors for 
                                                 
14
 Alexander, 529. 
15
 Valencia, 82. 
16
 Ong, 61 f. 
17
 Mensah, 633. 
18
 Numbering added by the author; Maritime Terrorism, Definitions; Chalk, RAND 2008, 3 uses the same 
definition. 
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ideological, religious, or political purposes.”19 As already mentioned in the above the 
purpose of the attack might also be other than political. Another criticism is that state-
actors are not included in the definition. Due to space restrictions I will only discuss non-
state maritime terrorism in this thesis, however. 
Some extend the definition of maritime terrorism to also include the use of the maritime 
transportation system, for example to smuggle terrorists or terrorist material into the 
targeted country.20 However, in my opinion this is more an act of preparation of the 
terrorist attack, but not “maritime terrorism” itself. Using the sea as a transport route can 
constitute preparation for various kinds of crimes, not only maritime terrorism. I will not 
include it in the definition. However, hindering terrorists from using waterways for the 
purpose of transporting their material is part of the prevention of maritime terrorism; I will 
discuss this later on in the thesis. 
Since there is as yet no internationally accepted definition, I will define “maritime 
terrorism” as: the threat or use of force within the maritime environment against a civilian 
or state target  (be it a vessel, a port, off-shore installation, the crew or passengers or other 
target) for political, social, ideological or religious objectives, i.e. other than financial 
objectives. 
2.1.3 Overlap between maritime terrorism and piracy 
The Santa Maria attack (see below p. 11) gave rise to worldwide debate as to whether the 
act should be considered as piracy or terrorism.21 The problem came up anew after the 
Achille Lauro attack and after the Seaborne Spirit incidents (see below p. 11 and p. 13). 
There was controversy as to whether terror and piracy could be treated as equal or how 
these acts were to be differentiated.22  
                                                 
19
 Pelkofski. 
20
 Maritime Terrorism, Definitions. 
21
 Stehr, 94 with further references. 
22
 Mejia, 33 seq. 
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In the media a conflation of piracy and terrorism has become more common since the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.23 The IMB has warned of an overlap of piracy and 
terrorism, particularly in Indonesia.24  
There might even be “partnerships” between pirates and terrorist groups.25 According to 
experts, many pirates in Indonesian waters (especially in the Malacca Strait) are acting 
under Al-Qaeda’s influence.26 Since that piracy is largely undertaken for commercial gain 
it is quite likely that pirates will not hesitate to carry out a terrorist act if someone pays 
enough money and if they have a reasonable chance of surviving. Terrorists may also carry 
out acts of piracy themselves as an alternative source of revenue for their main operations. 
There is certainly some overlap concerning tactics and methods used27, but piracy and 
terrorism have different objectives. The main difference between maritime terrorism and 
piracy is the motivation for the criminal act: whereas the terrorist act goes beyond the 
immediate danger of attacking a maritime target and the maritime terrorist commits a crime 
for ideological or political reasons, the pirate commits a financial crime and focusses at the 
terrorist act itself.28 
However, it is not always that simple to distinguish between the two; in many cases there is 
a nexus between maritime terrorism and piracy: The fact that the origins of maritime 
terrorism are connected to piracy is beyond dispute.29 However, some scholars even raise 
the question of whether extreme cases of piracy could be classified by international law and 
conventions as acts of maritime terrorism.30  
                                                 
23
 Thamm. 
24
 Valencia, 78 with further references. 
25
 Raymond, Threat. 
26
 Blanda. 
27
 Valencia, 84 seq.; Teo, 542. 
28
 Teo, 542. 
29
 Mednikarov/Kolev, 104. 
30
 Ong, 2, 15 seqq. 
 10
Many have claimed that: “Today’s pirate is tomorrow’s terrorist”.31 Several terrorist 
organizations seem to be working together with local pirates in order to get them to share 
their knowledge with them on, for example, how to enter ships.32 
There are reports of terrorists boarding vessels in Southeast Asia as a training exercise to 
improve their navigation and sailing skills.33 They wanted to learn how to pilot vessels to 
commit an attack at sea in a similar manner to the 9/11 attacks.34 Training seems necessary 
from the terrorists’ point of view because most of them are not used to the sea: Nine 
months before the USS Cole incident (see below p. 12) Al-Qaeda tried to commit an attack 
against the USS The Sullivans in the harbour of Aden, Yemen, but underestimated the 
weight of the explosives, so that the suicide boat sank as it entered the water.35 
However, this nexus between piracy and maritime terrorism is not uncontroversial: The 
latest research by the RAND Corporation states that to date there is no credible evidence to 
support the speculation about such a nexus. The objectives remain entirely different.36 For 
reasons of clarity I will use the term “maritime terrorism” in its original meaning in this 
thesis, that is without any overlap to piracy. 
2.2 Relevance of maritime terrorism  
I will present the most relevant maritime terrorism incidents that have already happened 
and will discuss why maritime terrorism is today more likely to occur than in the past. 
2.2.1 Historical review 
Maritime terrorism is not a new phenomenon. The history of maritime terrorism goes back 
to the 1930s when the “Organisation against fascism and in support of the USSR” (better 
                                                 
31
 See e.g. Blanda. 
32
 Raymond, Threat. 
33
 Chalk, RAND 2008, 32. 
34
 The Baltic Online; Chalk, RAND 2008, XIV. 
35
 Raymond, Threat; Pelkofski. 
36
 Chalk, RAND 2008, XIV. 
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known as “Wollweber league”) carried out more than 20 assassinations on merchant 
vessels of Fascist nations.37  
To exemplify maritime terrorism and to recall some past attacks, some of the most relevant 
incidents should be mentioned:38 
In 1961 a group of 70 people who opposed the Portuguese government hijacked the 
Portuguese passenger ship Santa Maria off the coast of Venezuela which had more than 
600 passengers on board. The group wanted to overthrow the Portuguese government. 
During the taking over of the vessel one person was killed. 
In 1985 four terrorists got on board the cruise ship Achille Lauro after one of them had 
previously taken a voyage on the ship to examine the security arrangements on board and 
to find out how it would be possible to kill as many people as possible. They were able to 
bring their weapons on board in their expensive looking hand luggage without any 
difficulties. On board they kept very much to themselves and the crew became suspicious, 
but did not mention their suspicions to the captain.39 The terrorists easily gained control 
over the ship and the hijackers demanded the release of 50 Palestinians from Israel. To add 
authority to their claim the hijackers killed one American passenger and jettisoned his dead 
body. The hijacking was actually not supposed to occur, instead the hijackers were part of a 
team which wanted to commit the attack in the next port of call, which was to be in Israel.40  
In July 1988 three terrorists belonging to a Palestinian terrorist group boarded the Greek 
ferry City of Poros together with some 540 other passengers. They boarded the ship as 
legitimate passengers carrying hidden weapons and hand grenades. Earlier on that day a car 
bomb had exploded on the pier where the vessel was supposed to be berthed a few hours 
later. The intended target was almost certainly the ship, but the bombs exploded too early. 
                                                 
37
 Stehr, 89 with further references. 
38
 Unless otherwise noted, the information on the maritime terrorist attacks is taken from: Thamm; Stehr, 89 
seq.; Chalk, RAND 2008, 48 seqq.;  Elegant; Helmer; Nincic; Cisterna in: Conference Maritime Security, 48-
50. 
39
 Parritt, Security, 13. 
40
 Wall, 72; Alexander, 540. 
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Just after the ship had left the port, the terrorists opened fire on the passengers. At least 
nine people died and more than 100 were injured.41 
The most spectacular attack at sea so far was committed in October 2000 by the suicide-
commando Yemeni-Islamic Jihad against the missile destroyer USS Cole.42 The vessel, 
measuring 150 meters, was in the harbour of Aden, when a small boat loaded with 300 
kilograms of explosives moved slowly towards the USS Cole, as if it wanted to sell 
something. This practice is not unusual in Third-World harbours, so the guards on the USS 
Cole were not at all suspicious. A few seconds later the small boat exploded and the 
explosion tore a hole in the vessel’s port side. 17 people were killed and 17 injured in the 
incident. 
In October 2002 – just one week before the second anniversary of the attack on the USS 
Cole – a similar maritime terrorist attack was carried out off the Yemeni coast. The French 
double-hull supertanker VLCC Limbourg (300,000 tons deadweight, at the time of the 
attack loaded with 55,000 tons of crude oil) was rammed by a speedboat packed with 
explosives which penetrated the double hull and exploded both inside and outside the hull. 
The attack was conducted while the tanker was awaiting a harbour pilot to guide the vessel 
to her mooring. At the time there was only one seaman on the bridge and when he saw a 
motorboat coming closer at very high speed it was already too late to prevent the attack. 
The VLCC Limbourg was aflame within only a few seconds and several 10,000 tons of 
crude oil flowed into the Gulf of Aden. One seaman was killed. 
The world’s deadliest terrorist attack at sea happened on February 27, 2004 when the ferry 
SuperFerry14 with about 900 passengers and crew was bombed in Manila Bay. As a result 
of the attack the ferry sank and more than 116 people were killed. A terrorist had gone on 
board as a passenger with a box containing a television set packed with 16 sticks of 
dynamite.43 He went to the cheapest passenger section of the ship, placed the box on his 
seat and slipped away just before the ferry cast off. According to Time magazine “the 
                                                 
41
 Parritt, Security, 17; FAS. 
42
 Raymond, Threat. 
43
 Chalk, RAND 2008, 26. 
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SuperFerry 14 bombing will go onto the rolls as the world’s fourth deadliest terrorist strike 
since Sept. 11, 2001, and Asia’s worst since the Bali bombings of October 2002.”44 
On April 24, 2004 the crew of the rigid-hulled inflatable vessel USS Firebolt attempted a 
boarding operation on an Arab sailing vessel that was approaching an oil terminal in Iraq. 
Just as they wanted to enter the vessel, it suddenly exploded in an apparent suicide 
bombing. The guardsman and two sailors were killed. 
In October 2005 the passengers of the luxury cruise ship Seaborne Spirit were woken up by 
machinegun fire and rocket-propelled grenade launchers which hit the vessel 160 km off 
the coast of Somalia.45 One member of the crew was slightly injured, but none of the 
passengers was injured. To date it is still unclear whether this incident qualifies as terrorism 
or piracy. 
After having mentioned various terrorist attacks, it might seem that maritime terrorism 
mainly exists outside of Europe. This is not true. Besides the City of Poros incident which I 
already mentioned I would like to give some more examples: In 1990 the IRA attacked and 
damaged the Royal Navy vessel Fort Victoria while it was being fitted in a shipyard. In 
1994 Algerian terrorists killed the crew of the Italian merchant vessel Lucina. And in 
January 1996 Chechen terrorists gained control over the Turkish ferry Avrasya which had 
220 passengers on board. The leader of this terrorist group demanded that some Chechens 
be set free otherwise, he would navigate the vessel towards the Bosporus and sink it there. 
The hijacking ended without loss of blood because the terrorists gave up.  
In October 2001 customs authorities in the south Italian harbour of Gioia Tauro became 
suspicious about a container on the pier which was to be shipped from Port Said (Egypt) 
via Gioia Tauro and Rotterdam to Canada. They inspected the container and found inside a 
bed, heater, toilet, food, plans of the destination airport in Canada, passports, a laptop, a 
mobile phone with spare batteries and a transcript identifying the potential terrorist as an 
airline mechanic. The suspect, who is associated with Al-Qaeda, was set free on bail and 
disappeared without a trace. 
                                                 
44
 Elegant. 
45
 Doyle; Kouri. 
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In June 2002 the Basque ETA tried to smuggle a car bomb onto the ferry Val De Loire 
which was shuttling between England and Spain. Fortunately, the attack was foiled. In July 
2002 ETA threatened to carry out attacks on the Norwegian cruise liner Seabourn Legend 
which was anchored near the Spanish-French border.  
Last but not least it should be mentioned that probably many more maritime terrorist 
attacks might have occurred than we can find in official statements. Due to reasons of 
marine insurance it is likely that many of maritime terrorist incidents have been declared as 
acts of piracy.46 
2.2.2 Relevance of maritime terrorism today 
The maritime area covers 139,768,200 square miles. This equates to ca. 2.4 times the 
planet’s terrestrial area.47 However, most of the marine area has the status of the high seas 
and therefore lies outside the jurisdiction of any other than the flag state, which often gives 
rise to serious problems concerning the enforcement of international law. 
Shipping is the heart of global trade and 92% of the worldwide trade is carried out by sea.48 
Every day more than 5 million containers are transported by sea and less than 5% of them 
are inspected in the ports.49 This makes commercial shipping an interesting target from a 
terrorist’s point of view. But passenger ships might also be targets: Both cruise ships and 
liner-ferries are used by more and more people every year.50 And cruise ships in particular 
might be seen as a symbol of Western luxury by terrorists. 
Nevertheless, only 2% of international terrorist attacks in the last 30 years have addressed 
maritime targets.51 There are several factors that could explain this: First, it has always 
been more difficult to carry out terrorist attacks at sea than on land because land targets are 
easier to reach.52 And most terrorists have more experience on land than at sea.53 
                                                 
46
 Thamm. 
47
 Chalk, RAND 2008, 2. 
48
 Thamm. 
49
 Abrams. 
50
 Thamm. 
51
 Chalk, RAND 2008, 3, 19.  
52
 Valencia, 84 seq. 
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Furthermore, maritime terrorists need special skills and knowledge in a number of areas: 
They have, for example, to include the tides, wind and weather conditions in their planning. 
For attacks at sea they also need equipment that is not ordinarily part of a land-locked 
terrorist's accoutrements.54 Terrorists want people to witness the attack, and the same is 
true of maritime terrorists. They want to spread pictures of their attack all over the world as 
propaganda for their deed.55 However, it was much more difficult in the past for the media 
to access and report from somewhere at sea than on the land. Being out of sight, the 
maritime targets were generally also out of mind.56 
Today the whole situation has changed: The obstacles that existed to committing a terrorist 
attack at sea have ceased to exist. Terrorists have found ways to gain sufficient knowledge 
about maritime targets (e.g. co-operation with local pirates, see above). There are five more 
factors which make a shift of terrorism from land-based to maritime targets likely 
nowadays57: First there are many gaps and weaknesses in maritime security because states 
have always devoted more resources to land-based security structures; second the growth 
of maritime sports enterprises makes it easy for terrorists to enrol in courses which provide 
them with the necessary knowledge on, for example diving; third sea-based attacks offer an 
additional means of causing economic destabilization, for example by committing an attack 
which leads to the blocking of a chokepoint at the same time; fourth maritime terrorism 
constitutes a potential for “mass coercive punishment”58 (especially concerning cruise ships 
or ferries), because the passengers are confined to a single space and cannot leave it easily; 
finally container shipping offers terrorists a means of transporting all their material and 
personnel. 
Since September 11, 2001 there have been various indications that Al-Qaeda and affiliated 
groups are turning their attention to maritime terrorism and that they have developed a 
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maritime attack capability.59 Only a few weeks after September 11, 2001 plans for attacks 
against diverse targets in Singapore were discovered (inter alia against oil refineries in the 
harbour and the US warships).60 According to investigations, Al-Qaeda has 12-50 of its 
own commercial vessels, which can be used to transport weapons, explosives or personnel 
or as mother ships for flexible commandos.61 So the circumstances for committing a 
maritime terrorist attack have changed a lot in recent times, which makes such attacks more 
likely that it was the case in the past. 
2.3 Main scenarios of maritime terrorism 
Any classification implicates the danger of a generalization, because maritime terrorism is 
not static. There is not only one specific way for carrying out an attack. In fact, there are 
various possible scenarios for maritime terrorism and alternative scenarios could 
complement one another. However, there are some main scenarios of maritime terrorism 
which are of particular concern in the post-September 11 world. They can be divided into 
the four following groups: firstly, terrorists using the sea as a transport route (2.3.1), 
secondly, terrorists using ships as weapons against targets at sea or on land (2.3.2), thirdly, 
terrorist attacks on vessels and other objects at sea (2.3.3), and fourthly, the intensification 
of the aforementioned scenarios by using weapons of mass destruction or dangerous 
materials (2.3.4).62 
2.3.1 Scenario 1 (the sea as a transport route) 
First of all terrorists could use the sea as a way to transport weapons, explosives or 
personnel. There is especially great concern regarding the transport of nuclear material by 
sea. This scenario could also occur in combination with the hijacking of a vessel for 
transport purposes thereafter. In this situation the question arises of whether it constitutes 
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the legal basis for ships to be stopped and boarded pre-emptively (which will be discussed 
later).  
2.3.2 Scenario 2 (ships being used as weapons against targets at sea or on land) 
A ship could be used as a weapon (in the manner of the World Trade Center and Pentagon 
attack) to attack another vessel, to attack port facilities or other coastal targets. This 
scenario of the “floating bomb”63 could for example be fulfilled by getting a container with 
hazardous material on the ship which explodes in a harbour. This scenario could also occur 
in combination with the boarding and hijacking of a vessel which is thereafter used as a 
weapon. 
2.3.3 Scenario 3 (terrorist attacks against objects at sea) 
Terrorists could attack a vessel directly at sea be it, for example, a cargo vessel, tanker, 
ferry or cruise ship. My distinction between scenario 2 (under 2.3.2) and 3 is the following: 
In scenario 2 the vessel is used to destroy another object and in scenario 3 the vessel itself 
is to be destroyed. Scenario 3 could involve ramming the vessel with another vessel (e.g. 
one loaded with explosives, see the USS Cole and the VLCC Limbourg incidents 
mentioned above on p. 12) – a scenario which is especially likely to occur in narrow 
waterways where there is not much room to avoid the attack. Another way of attacking a 
vessel is by getting an object with explosives on board the vessel. In this case the terrorist 
can decide where and when the object is going to explode and it is not even necessary that 
he is on board the vessel at the time of the explosion (see e.g. the SuperFerry 14 incident 
above on p. 12 seq.). The terrorist could also use a container to get the explosives on board. 
Furthermore, terrorists could commit attacks against other objects at sea than vessels (e.g. 
drilling or other offshore platforms); this situation will not be addressed in this thesis. 
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2.3.4 Scenario 4 (weapons of mass destruction or dangerous materials) 
Maritime terrorists could commit their attack by using weapons of mass destruction or 
other dangerous materials or they could hijack a vessel carrying such materials. The use of 
weapons of mass destruction or dangerous materials can be combined with all the different 
possible scenarios of maritime terrorism. 
3 Prevention of maritime terrorism 
There are two starting points for the prevention of maritime terrorism: On the one hand the 
prevention of maritime terrorism is part of the general fight against terrorism; on the other 
hand maritime terrorism can be fought by improving maritime security. These two aspects 
can often not clearly be separated from each other. So to tackle the legal concept of 
preventing maritime terrorism I will also discuss both of them. 
First I want to discuss the aspect of maritime security. To effectively prevent maritime 
terrorism we need various regulations in all the areas which might be especially exposed to 
the threat of maritime terrorism. The method I want to use is an evaluation of the present 
regulations with regard to five “risk-factors” which are in my opinion the most important 
factors of maritime security: the vessels, the ports, the containers, the crews and the 
passengers. The second issue that I will discuss is the boarding and searching of vessels 
which is a prevention of maritime terrorism but also a prevention of any other terrorist act 
(on land or in the air), because it cuts off the supply with weapons, other material or 
personnel.  
3.1 Change in the legal regime following 9/11/2001 
The legal regime on maritime security changed fundamentally in the aftermath of 9/11. 
Historically, international law on maritime terrorism has been reactive, rather than 
preventive in nature.64 Since the early 1990s the IMO has undertaken significant work on 
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the prevention of piracy but not so much on terrorism and only one multilateral Convention 
aimed (inter alia) at protecting shipping against terrorism, namely the SUA Convention. 
This convention came as a reaction to the Achille Lauro attack (see above p. 11). 
Following September 11, 2001 the international community’s awareness of the risk to 
maritime security increased fundamentally. If an attack could be launched using a plane, it 
might also be possible to launch similar attacks using a ship65 and this would pose a serious 
threat to the international transport system. However, striking the balance between on the 
one hand doing nothing and on the other hand overreacting was not that easy. It was 
necessary to find a balance between freedom of navigation and security interests66 and after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11  the willingness to delimit freedom of shipping with 
regard to security aspects remarkably increased. It was agreed that amendments to make 
international shipping more secure against terrorist attacks would be made to the SOLAS 
Convention67 and in December 2002 the IMO enshrined the ISPS Code in the SOLAS 
Convention.68 The fact that this convention was chosen for the amendments is interesting, 
because the SOLAS Convention nominally regulates the safety of life at sea and not 
security issues. In the past it was the UN and not the IMO that was responsible for 
maritime security.69  
After the 9/11 incidents the SUA was also amended (inter alia the list of offences was 
expanded70). Besides SOLAS and SUA more of the legal framework on maritime terrorism 
was affected by the 9/11 incidents. The most important regulations will be discussed below 
in connection with the relevant risk factors. 
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3.2 Risk factor: vessels 
There are two main legal aspects concerning the vessel as a risk factor of maritime 
terrorism: First in order to prevent the risk being realized there must be sufficient 
regulations governing maritime security and second we need sufficient regulations to board 
and inspect vessels to prevent terrorists from using the vessel as a supply base for their 
weapons, other material or personnel or even to commit the attack. I will discuss these two 
issues in the following. 
3.2.1 Vessel security 
Vessels can be qualified as “interesting” targets from a terrorist’s point of view for at least 
two reasons: first because the transport of goods by ships forms the heart of global trade 
and global trade is dependent on maritime transport. The UNCTAD estimated that 5.8 
billion tonnes of goods were transported by sea in 2001, which is more than 80% of the 
global trade volume. Maritime trade is expanding steadily and reached 7 billion tons in 
2005.71 The second reason is that, in addition to transporting of goods, vessels are also a 
means of transporting people (e.g. ferries or cruise ships).  
3.2.1.1 SUA  
The SUA Convention does not contain any provisions governing vessel security. 
According to Art. 13 and 14 the states are to co-operate to prevent offences. However, 
there are no concrete provisions governing powers and authorities concerning this 
prevention. In other words, the current version of the SUA Convention does not provide a 
clear basis concerning which preventive measures are allowed and which are not (this issue 
will be further discussed under 3.2.2). 
3.2.1.2 SOLAS and ISPS 
The main source concerning provisions on vessel security is SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and 
particularly the ISPS Code, which was enshrined in SOLAS in 2002. Part A of the ISPS 
Code contains mandatory requirements for the purpose of compliance with SOLAS 
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Chapter XI-2 and Part B a non-mandatory guidance. In the United States Part B is also 
mandatory.72 Other chapters of SOLAS also contain important provisions on maritime 
security.  
The main elements concerning ship security are: the Automatic Identification System 
(AIS), the Ship Identification Number (SIN), the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), Ship 
Security Assessment (SSA), the Ship Security Plan (SSP) and International Ship Security 
Certificate (ISSC), a Ship Security Officer (SSO) and a Company Security Officer (CSO). 
Furthermore, I would like to explain the control and non-compliance measures. 
3.2.1.2.1 Ship Identification Number (SIN) 
SOLAS Chapter XI-1 Regulation 3 requires vessels to prominently and permanently 
display their unique identification number. This was introduced by adapting Resolution 
A.600 (15) in 1987, which was made mandatory in 1994 for all passenger ships of 100 
gross tonnage and upwards and for all cargo ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards. The 
Ship Identification Number remains unchanged upon transfer of the ship to another flag 
and should be inserted in the ship’s certificates. 
In May 2005, the IMO adopted a new regulation which is expected to enter into force on 1 
January 2009 referring to the company and registered owner identification number 
(SOLAS XI-1 Regulation 3.1).73 The aim is to introduce more transparency regarding the 
true ownership of the vessel. 
3.2.1.2.2 Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
Certain technical equipment is also to be involved to guarantee ship security. All vessels of 
300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages and cargo ships of 500 
gross tonnage and upwards not engaged in international voyages and passenger ships 
irrespective of size will have to be fitted with the AIS (Regulation 19.2.4. Chapter V 
SOLAS). This system helps ships to easily track, identify and exchange pertinent 
navigation information with other ships and with shore-based facilities. The AIS led to the 
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adoption of regulations for Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of ships by 
satellite in SOLAS Chapter V in May 2006 and entered into force 1 January 2008.74 These 
regulations are expected to be in operation from 31 December 2008.75 Another important 
technical feature in this context is the Global Maritime Distress Signal System (GMDSS) 
which was implemented in SOLAS Chapter IV back in 1999.76 Using the AIS ports and 
coastal states will be better able to cope with the threat of maritime terrorism, because they 
will be able to identify ships navigating though their waters.  
3.2.1.2.3 Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) 
This system will have to be installed at the latest from 2006 on every seagoing vessel. All 
ships constructed on or after 1 July 2004 will have to be provided with this system 
(Regulation 6.1.1. Chapter XI-2 SOLAS). There are special regulations concerning the 
timeframe for the adoption of the system on passenger ships, oil tankers and chemical 
tankers (Regulation 6.1.2 and 3). 
The mode of operation of the SSAS is described in Regulation 6.2.: By pushing a button a 
constant alarm signal will be transmitted to the competent authority, which may also be a 
shipping company. It will neither be audible on board the vessel nor for other vessels. 
There have been some problems and concerns about what information is to be transmitted 
to the competent authorities to allow for the identification of the vessel. In May 2006 the 
IMO thus issued a guidance on what information is to be provided.77 In addition to that the 
Sub-Committee (of the Maritime Safety Committee) on Radio Communications and Search 
and Rescue (COMSAR) agreed that the IMO should establish a database containing the 
specific requirements regarding ship security alert systems.78 
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3.2.1.2.4 Ship Security Assessment (SSA) 
The SSA is regulated in Section 8 of the ISPS Code. It is designed to identify weaknesses 
in physical structures, personnel protection systems, processes or other areas that may lead 
to a security breach.79 The SSA is to be carried out before developing and updating the 
SSP. The (minimum) elements of the SSA are described in Section 8.4 ISPS Code.80 
3.2.1.2.5 Ship Security Plan (SSP) and International Ship Security Certificate 
(ISSC) 
The SSP must be elaborated and carried on board the vessel (Regulation 9 SOLAS Chapter 
XI-2; Section 9 ISPS Code). The Plan must, inter alia, address: Measures to prevent 
weapons, dangerous substances and devices intended for use against people (9.4.1. ISPS 
Code), identification of restricted areas (9.4.2. ISPS Code) and measures for the prevention 
of unauthorized access to the ship (9.4.3. ISPS Code). The SSP should indicate the 
operational and physical security measures that the ship itself can take to always operate at 
security level 1. It should also indicate the additional measures which make it possible to 
move to security level 2 or 3.81 These measures might include controlling access to the 
vessel itself, denying access to certain parts of the vessel, screening passengers and 
personnel, screening baggage and the loading of stores. Furthermore, the SOLAS/ISPS 
ships will have to carry an International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) indicating 
compliance with the requirements of SOLAS XI-2 and Part A of the ISPS Code (Section 19 
ISPS Code).82  
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3.2.1.2.6 Ship Security Officer (SSO) 
An SSO will have to be designated for each ship (Section 12 ISPS Code) by the shipping 
company. The duties and responsibilities of the SSO are regulated in Section 12.2. ISPS 
Code: He will, inter alia, be responsible for security checks on board, the implementation 
of the SSP and the reporting of security incidents. 
3.2.1.2.7 Company Security Officer (CSO) 
The CSO will have to be designated by the shipping company. The CSO’s responsibilities 
include, inter alia, ensuring that an SSA is properly carried out, that SSPs are prepared and 
submitted for approval and thereafter placed on board the ship. The CSO will also make 
sure that the SSA is carried out by a person with the appropriate skills (Section 11 ISPS 
Code). 
3.2.1.2.8 Control and compliance measures  
Chapter XI-2 SOLAS and Part A of the ISPS Code contain several regulations governing 
control and compliance measures. The control and compliance regime is divided between 
the flag state, the port state and the contracting governments: The flag state needs to ensure 
that the vessel is in compliance with (national and) international regulations. The port state 
can make inspections with regard to the vessel irrespective of its flag when it is in port. 
However, such inspections will not normally extend to an examination of the SSP itself 
except in specific circumstances.83 Usually inspections of the ships in port are limited to 
controlling whether they are carrying a valid ISSC on board (Regulation 9.1.1.). However, 
if the officers duly authorized by a contracting government have clear grounds to believe 
that a vessel is not in compliance with Chapter XI-2 SOLAS or Part A of the ISPS Code, 
they will impose further control measures: inspection of the ship, delaying the ship, 
detention of the ship or restriction of operations, including movement within the port or 
exclusion of the ship from port (Regulation 9.1.2. and 1.3. SOLAS Chapter XI-2). 
Contracting governments may for security purposes require that ships intending to enter its 
ports provide them with certain information, for example whether the ship possesses a valid 
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certificate and at which security level the ship is currently operating (Regulation 9.2.). 
Denial of entry into port or expulsion from port will only be imposed when there are clear 
grounds to believe that the ship poses an immediate threat to the security or safety of 
persons or of ships or other property and there are no other means for removing the threat 
(Regulation 9.3.3). 
3.2.1.2.9 Critique of the legal regime concerning vessel security 
In my opinion some aspects of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code can be criticised. I 
would like to point out some of the main problems. First of all, Regulation 7.3 SOLAS 
Chapter XI-2 is problematical: According to this regulation the contracting government has 
to advise ships operating in its territorial sea or having communicated an intention to enter 
its territorial sea of the current security levels when a risk of attack has been identified. 
Furthermore, the government will have to be advised of the security measures that should 
have been put in place by the ships concerned to protect themselves and of the security 
measures that the coastal state has decided to put in place. However, it is for every flag 
state to decide which of these advised security measures it adopts or what assistance on 
security measures it accepts. Therefore, some scholars argue that it should also be up to the 
flag states to provide guidance on the security measures concerning ships flying their 
flags.84 However, in my opinion it is important that flag states receive advice from other 
states, because this means that it is at least more “uncomfortable” for flag of convenience 
states in particular not to apply the relevant security measures. 
Another problem is that SOLAS Chapter XI-2 is only applicable to vessels on international 
voyages (Regulation 2 SOLAS XI-2) and, besides passenger ships, the chapter is only 
applicable to cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards. I welcome the fact that the 
chapter applies to any kind of passenger ship irrespective of size, but it should also be 
applicable to smaller cargo ships because they can also be targets of or means for maritime 
terrorism in the same way as the bigger cargo ships. The fact that SOLAS Chapter XI-2 is 
not applied to national voyages should be resolved by national law. 
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A general problem is that the IMO has no enforcement powers on its own and is dependent 
on the flag or port state to enforce the new regulations governing maritime security. Since 
many of the “flags of convenience” states have increased their power in the IMO, the IMO 
is trapped in a vicious circle concerning the enforcement of maritime security rules.85 I 
would therefore recommend the IMO itself having enforcement powers. 
Another problem is that new technical features make it possible not only for security 
authorities, but also for terrorists to get information about various vessels: Everyone can 
buy an AIS and can find out where which vessel with which cargo on board is situated. The 
SIN makes is possible for terrorists to find out which cargo vessels have loaded.86 So in my 
opinion regulations and controls should be introduced to track who is able to purchase an 
AIS. 
3.2.2 Boarding of vessels 
The issue which I want to analyze in this section can be but in one question: Is it possible 
under the existing law to cut off terrorists’ logistical supply by sea? We need a basis for 
precautionary measures to control cargo, because otherwise the freedom of navigation 
might be misused to support terrorism.87 If we do not have a basis for such measures we 
will not be able to act before the threat materializes. One of the main problems concerning 
the prevention of maritime terrorism is the boarding and inspection of vessels. I want to 
give an overview of the existing legal regime and to present a new draft SUA provision on 
the boarding of vessels which has not entered into force yet. 
3.2.2.1 UNCLOS 
One must differentiate between several situations depending on where the vessel is situated 
at the moment of boarding and inspection: the internal waters (Art. 8.1. UNCLOS), the 
territorial sea (Art. 2 UCLOS), the contiguous zone (Art. 33 UNCLOS), the exclusive 
economic zone (Art. 55 UNCLOS) and finally the high seas (Art. 86 UNCLOS). 
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3.2.2.1.1 Internal waters and territorial sea 
In the internal waters and the territorial sea the coastal state has the authority to intervene 
because of its full territorial sovereignty. The coastal state’s jurisdiction is only limited by 
the right of innocent passage (Art. 17 UNCLOS). “Passage” is defined in Art. 18 
UNCLOS. And “innocent” is defined in Art. 19 UNCLOS as being not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. The right of innocent passage may be 
further limited by the national law of the state concerned (Art. 21 UNCLOS). Art. 19.2 
UNCLOS mentions some cases where passage is not innocent. However, the preparation of 
terrorist acts (e.g. by transporting weapons) is not mentioned and most consider the list in 
Art. 19.2. UNCLOS to be exhaustive.88 So recourse to the general provision in paragraph 1 
is necessary: Passage is not innocent if it is prejudicial to the peace, good order or security 
of the coastal state. Is the transport of terrorist material prejudicial to the peace, good order 
or security of the coastal state? Some scholars argue that passage is not innocent when 
there is reasonable suspicion that the vessel is involved in proliferation. They base their 
argumentation on UN SC Resolution 1540.89 Other authors have serious doubts as to 
whether interdiction measures may be based upon the assumption of the non-innocent 
nature of the transport of WMD.90 I would like to stress that the text of Art. 19.1. defines 
passage as not being innocent when it is prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of 
the coastal state. This is not the case when the vessel is only in transit on its way to 
another country. So the definition of innocent is very narrow. Neither Art. 21, 23 or 27 
UNCLOS can serve as a basis for controlling ships in transit.91  
3.2.2.1.2 Contiguous zone and continental shelf 
In the contiguous zone and on the continental shelf the coastal state only has certain 
sovereign rights: The coastal state has the right to exercise control measures in the 
contiguous zone (Art. 33 UNCLOS). These measures concern only the prevention of an 
                                                 
88
 Wolfrum, Lecture, Footnote 35 with further references. 
89
 Heintschel von Heinegg in: Conference Maritime Security, 113. 
90
 Friedman, at 3. 
91
 Wolfrum, Lecture, Footnote 18 with further references. 
 28
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws, but not the prevention of 
maritime terrorist attacks. So in this zone, the prevention of terrorist attacks is only 
incumbent upon the coastal state if terrorists smuggle weapons or want to infiltrate the 
territory of the coastal state and if that can be qualified as a violation of customs or 
immigration regulations. Since this thesis does not discuss maritime terrorist attacks against 
installations on the continental shelf, I will not further mention the coastal states’ rights to 
prevent maritime terrorism on the continental shelf. 
3.2.2.1.3 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
The question of whether the current legal regime under UNCLOS is adequate for coping 
with maritime terrorism in the EEZ has not been discussed a great deal so far.92 Art. 73 
UNCLOS regulates the boarding and inspection by the coastal state in the EEZ. However, 
this only concerns the exercise of the state’s sovereign rights with regard to the living 
resources in the EEZ. Where a maritime terrorist attack might lead to environmental 
damage to (endangered) species (e.g. oil spills), then a preventive boarding act might in my 
opinion be qualified as an act to conserve living marine resources in the EEZ within the 
meaning of Art. 73.1 UNCLOS.  Since Art. 58 II UNCLOS states that the rules concerning 
the high seas (Art. 88-115) also apply to the EEZ, I would like to refer to the discussion 
under 3.2.2.1.4. 
3.2.2.1.4 High seas 
The issue of the boarding and inspection of vessels is most problematic on the high seas. 
Several times ships have been boarded and inspected on the high seas: In December 2001 
the MV Nisha was stopped by British ships in international waters. Security sources said 
that the vessel was carrying “terrorist material”. However, in a comprehensive inch-by-inch 
search spread over three days nothing was found.93 In December 2002 two Spanish naval 
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ships stopped and boarded a North Korean cargo vessel which flew no flag on the high 
seas. The boarding party found fifteen SCUD missiles hidden under sacks of cement.94  
“High seas” is defined in Art. 86 UNCLOS and Art. 87 UNCLOS regulates the principle of 
the freedom of the high seas. Freedom of the high seas is guaranteed by the flag state 
principle, that means the extension of the sovereignty of the flag state to its vessels: Vessels 
are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag states when they are on the high seas (Art. 
92 UNCLOS). This provision is a codification of the principle which was already 
mentioned in the so-called “Lotus Case” by the PCIJ in 1924.95 As regards our question of 
the boarding and inspection of vessels that means that basically no state other than the flag 
state has the right to control vessels on the high seas. There are exceptions when there are 
contractual agreements (there are several bilateral ship-boarding agreements which are 
consistent with UNCLOS96) between states or when international public law allows for 
exceptions.  
Does UNCLOS contain such an exception that allows for the boarding of a ship on the high 
seas? First of all Art. 110 might be relevant. In the exceptions mentioned in Art. 110 
UNCLOS the naval ship may first verify the boarded vessel’s right to fly its flag or may 
check its documents and only further examine the ship if “suspicion remains.” However, 
maritime terrorism is not mentioned in this provision. Therefore, some scholars are in 
favour of the analogous application of Art. 110 1 (a) UNCLOS in cases of maritime 
terrorism.97 Since the phenomena of maritime terrorism and piracy are in my opinion per 
definitione not comparable (see above p. 8 seqq.), a legal analogy is not possible. So I do 
not want to follow that approach.  
An interesting legal question is whether UN SC Resolutions 1373 and 1540 have a legal 
impact on UNCLOS Art. 110 by extending the exceptions to cover flag state consent.98 In 
my opinion there is neither room for an analogy nor for an extensive interpretation of 
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Art.110. 1 (a) UNCLOS.99 Other scholars argue that Art. 88 UNCLOS provides the basis 
for the boarding and inspection of vessels being that are suspected of supplying 
terrorism.100 Since the provision is rather general, I am not of the opinion that we can use it 
as a legal basis for the boarding of a vessel. 
Art. 111 (right of hot pursuit) only deals with criminal repression and not the prevention of 
maritime terrorism. Therefore, it does not provide us with a solution for the legal problem 
either.  
So in summary it can be said that UNCLOS does not provide the basis for the boarding of 
ships on the high seas without flag state consent to prevent an act of terrorism. 
3.2.2.2 The SUA Convention 
The SUA Convention does not contain any concrete provisions on authorizations 
concerning the prevention of maritime terrorism (only a rather general statement on 
prevention in Art. 13).101 The United States proposed an amendment of the SUA 
Convention  to establish proceedings for boarding ships on the high seas in order to prevent 
terrorist acts.102 They wanted the SUA to allow the state to which the vessel is headed to 
intervene on the high seas in order to take preventive action. There was debate as to 
whether this boarding provision is consistent with international law, and several 
delegations expressed concern about the US proposals, because they might be subject to 
abuse.103 However, the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention adds a new Art. 8 bis to 
allow for the boarding of vessels on the high seas suspected of being involved in terrorist 
activities.104 This amended Protocol has not entered into force yet (as at 30 June 2008).105 
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The new Art. 8 bis covers co-operation and procedures to be followed if a state party which 
is not the flag state desires to board a ship.106 The requesting party needs to have reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the ship or a person on board the ship is, has been or is about to be 
involved in the commission of an offence under the SUA Convention. Authorization for 
boarding can be given by the flag state ad hoc or in general (by notification of the IMO 
secretary general or directly to the requesting state). To deal with the problem of the “flag 
of convenience” states the possibility of “tacit approval” was included: If the authorities of 
the flag state do not respond within four hours to such a request, the boarding is allowed. 
However, in my opinion the time frame of only four hours seems quite arbitrary. Vessels 
very often operate far away from the flag state and time differences must also be taken into 
account. 
Art. 8 bis of the 2005 Protocol includes several safeguards when measures such as boarding 
or inspections are taken against a vessel: not to endanger the safety at sea, to ensure that all 
persons on board are treated in a manner which preserves human dignity, human rights law 
must be observed, due account must be taken of safety and security of the ship and its 
cargo, only environmentally sound measures are to be taken, and reasonable efforts must be 
taken to ensure that a ship is not unduly detained or delayed. Finally, the use of force is to 
be avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of officials and persons on board or 
where the officials are in the execution of authorized actions. 
In my opinion, the new Art. 8 bis is a progressive provision on preventing terrorism at sea, 
not only because it offers the possibility of boarding by a non-flag state but also because it 
contains a certain degree of flexibility concerning the authorization by the flag state. I hope 
that Art. 8 bis enters into force soon. The provision creates an appropriate and proportional 
balance between the freedom of navigation and security interests.  
If we compare Art. 8 bis with the boarding and inspection provisions of the United Nations 
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement (Art. 20.6, 21.8, 22), we see that Art. 8 bis is more 
innovative, because it allows for tacit approval. However, since Art. 8 bis does not give us 
any basis for boarding on the high seas where the flag state refuses to give admission, I 
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would welcome a modification to this provision: the flag state should only be allowed to 
refuse admission in certain cases. 
Art. 8 bis also poses some questions: How to get reliable information early enough to 
intervene? Art. 8 bis allows for boarding if there is reasonable suspicion that the vessel is 
involved in terrorist activities. The state in question can request the relevant 
information concerning details about crew, passengers, cargo and destination to their ports 
of call (this will be further discussed below).107  
Another question is: How much information is needed to determine that the grounds for 
boarding are “reasonable”. This is dependent on the interpretation of that term different 
states will hold different opinions. In German security and police law we use the following 
formula to balance protected legal interests in situations of perceived danger: Even little 
and vague evidence gives authorization to act if the protected interest/object is of high legal 
(i.e. non-financial) value (e.g. life and limb of persons). On the other hand, if the 
interest/object that might be subject to a terrorist attack is legally less valuable (like e.g. 
property), we need more evidence to get the authorization to act. I would like to transfer 
this rule to our situation, namely the boarding of vessels on the high seas: If we have any at 
least vague evidence or indications that the terrorist attack might be committed against the 
life and limb of persons we have “reasonable grounds” for the boarding and inspection of 
the vessel on the high seas. However, if we only have evidence or indications that the 
terrorist attack might be committed against property, only vague evidence is not sufficient 
for authorization. 
3.2.2.3 Other approaches 
Since UNCLOS does not allow for boarding on the high seas to prevent maritime terrorism 
and Art. 8 bis SUA has not entered into force yet, I would like to discuss whether we have 
another legal basis for boarding on the high seas.  
There are several approaches to developing a basis for inspection by non-flag states on the 
high seas, which to some extent slightly overlap. Unfortunately, I cannot provide an in-
depth discussion here, but I would like to give a short overview: 
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3.2.2.3.1 Obligation erga omnes 
If a violation of an obligation erga omnes is supposed to be committed with the help of the 
vessel, other states than the flag state might have the right to board and inspect it. The 
prevention of (maritime) terrorism is not such an obligation erga omnes, but the right to life 
(being a fundamental human right) is an obligation erga omnes.108 However, the transport 
of terrorist material or personnel on a vessel is a purely preparatory act and does not violate 
the right to life. So we cannot derive the right to board a vessel on the high seas from this 
institute.  
3.2.2.3.2 With the consent of the flag state 
Boarding of vessels is legal when it happens with the consent of the flag state (e.g. on the 
basis of a bilateral agreement). Since the prevention of (maritime) terrorism does not 
violate jus cogens, such consent is generally admissible. The only problem in this case is 
whether the flag state is free to give its consent or whether consent must be given to the 
requesting state in certain cases.109  
3.2.2.3.3 To protect own nationals 
There might be a right or even an obligation of the non-flag states to board the ship to 
safeguard their own nationals on this ship even if the flag states has not given its authority 
to do so.110 A right to board to protect own nationals might especially be relevant when the 
flag state is unable or unwilling to react, because it either does not have the capacity or the 
will to act with due diligence with regard to its flag state control.111  
Whereas some scholars qualify such boarding as a violation of the principle of non-
intervention and therefore as a violation of the flag state principle112, others make this 
decision more dependent on the actual circumstances of the situation.113 Boarding might be 
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justified under the principle of necessity. According to other scholars, the right of a non-
flag state to safeguard the people by boarding and inspecting the vessel derives from the 
general principle of safeguarding human life.114 The boarding is not justified if force within 
the meaning of Art. 2.4. UN Charter is used.115  
3.2.2.3.4 Vessels without nationality 
Another approach might be considered: Can vessels under the control of terrorists be 
treated as ships without nationality since the flag state has lost control within the meaning 
of Art. 110. 1 (d)  UNCLOS?116 This would mean that any state would be entitled to arrest 
and seize these ships. However, Art. 104 UNCLOS only provides for the retention or loss 
of nationality of a pirate ship not of a terrorist vessel. Since piracy and terrorism are 
completely different phenomena, the provision can not be applied analogously.  
We could also pose the following question: Can a vessel carrying WMD or terrorists be 
legally qualified as stateless, if the flag state refuses to grant consent to board?117 Since 
Art. 104 only explicitly mentions pirate ships and piracy and terrorism are not comparably, 
I do not want to follow this approach. 
3.2.2.3.5 Pre-emptive self-defence 
Boarding of a vessel by a non-flag state might be justified as a measure of pre-emptive self-
defence according to Art. 51 UN Charter.118 The approach of individual or collective self-
defence against terrorism is repeated in UN SC Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 
(2001),119 but has not yet become customary law.120 
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There are several controversial issues connected with Art. 51 UN Charter.121 First of all, it 
is a matter of debate as to whether only state attacks are included or also attacks by private 
parties. The second controversial issue is whether Art. 51 can be applied preventively. I 
will not discuss these problems here, because they have already been discussed by others 
several times in great depth. In my opinion, activities by private parties should be allowed 
and a preventive application should be included. So the boarding of vessels could be 
qualified as pre-emptive self-defence. 
Resolution 1373 in particular and its obligation to suppress terrorism by eliminating its 
financial and logistical support is regarded as providing the legal basis for approaching and 
boarding ships under foreign flags and investigating their documents, their cargo and crew 
where there are indications that they may be supporting terrorism. However, these 
measures must be appropriate to be justified.122 
3.2.2.3.6 UN SC Resolution 1540 
In April 2004, following a request from the United States, the UN SC adopted a resolution 
on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Resolution 1540). There were two 
concerns that led to this comprehensive resolution: terrorism and the proliferation of 
WMD.123 The resolution imposes several obligations on states with regard to the boarding 
of vessels and reinforces certain non-proliferation objectives of the NPT, and key NPT 
obligations.124 Most important is the obligation to adopt domestic measures to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD. This resolution might be (possibly in connection with the 
abovementioned Resolutions 1368 and 1373) regarded as a basis for the preventive 
boarding of vessels on the high seas. 
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3.2.2.3.7 Holistic approach 
Some scholars propose a more holistic approach.125 They say the worldwide fight against 
terrorism derives from UN SC Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), SOLAS and the 
general rules of international public law. Since the UN is based on the principle of 
reciprocal security, states have the authority to control a vessel in the interest of a flag state 
when there are sufficient suspicious facts for (preparation of) terrorist activities. I do not 
like this approach, because being so undogmatic it lacks a true legal basis, in my opinion. 
3.2.2.4 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
The PSI is an initiative of the United States aimed at stopping shipments of WMD, their 
delivery systems and related materials worldwide.126 The core element of the PSI is the 
Statement of Interdiction Principles.127 The PSI was announced by the United States in 
May 2003 and started with ten countries. On the first anniversary meeting of the PSI, more 
than 60 states had already expressed their support for the PSI.128  
The PSI creates a framework for international co-operation based on a set of activities 
rather than a formal treaty-based organization.129 It does not establish “formal obligations 
for participating states, but does represent a political commitment to establish best practices 
to stop proliferation-related shipments.”130 On the basis of this political framework, states 
enter into bilateral agreements with the United States that allow vessels flagged in those 
states to be boarded. Bilateral ship-boarding agreements usually include a provision stating 
that if the flag state has not responded to a boarding request within a number of hours it is 
deemed to have given consent to the boarding.131 Numbers 4 b-d of the Statement of 
Interdiction contain provisions governing the boarding and searching of vessels by the flag 
state when the vessels are in the internal waters, territorial sea or areas beyond the 
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territorial seas of any state. When the vessel is “reasonably suspected” of transporting 
cargoes of WMD, it might be boarded by the flag state on its own initiative or at the request 
of another state (this is similar to the draft of Art. 8 bis SUA, see above p. 30 seqq.).  
Questions have been raised as to whether the PSI principles are consistent with 
international law, in particular with the provisions of UNCLOS.132 When discussing this 
legal problem, a distinction must be made between boarding by the flag state when the 
vessel is in internal or territorial waters, boarding in international waters (EEZ and high 
seas) and boarding by the coastal state while the vessel is in the territorial sea or contiguous 
zone.  
The principles regarding the boarding of vessels by the flag state in its internal waters or 
the territorial sea are consistent with UNCLOS133, but are the interdiction principles in 
international waters (EEZ and high seas) also consistent with UNCLOS? According to 
Art. 92 UNCLOS, vessels in these waters are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag 
state (except for circumstances provided for under UNCLOS or other international law). So 
the consent of the flag state is needed to board vessels on the high seas. Number 4 c of the 
PSI Interdiction Principles provides that the participating state (in our case the flag state) 
should seriously consider providing consent to such boarding under appropriate 
circumstances. Also the Frequently Asked Questions on the PSI make it clear that the 
interdiction of vessels in international waters is dependent on the consent of the flag state: 
“PSI actions will be taken consistent with existing national legal authority and international 
law and frameworks. This includes relevant international legal principles relating to 
boarding of vessels on the high seas. In the case of interdiction of vessels flying flags of 
convenience, the consent of the flag state would ordinarily provide a clear basis for a 
boarding on the high seas under international law.”134 So as regards boarding on the high 
seas, the PSI is consistent with UNCLOS. 
The most controversial principles set out in the interdiction principles of the PSI concern 
the boarding and inspection of vessels by coastal states while they are in their territorial sea 
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or contiguous zone and vessels entering or leaving the territorial sea.135 Pursuant to 
UNCLOS these vessels have a right to innocent passage. As already discussed in the above 
(p. 27), the transport of WMD or material to construct WMD is to be qualified as being 
innocent when the vessel is only in transit, because such passage is not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal state. So a vessel in the territorial sea or 
contiguous zone should not be boarded when the vessel is only in transit because such 
passage is “innocent” according to UNCLOS. Therefore, in my opinion the PSI is not 
consistent with UNCLOS in regard to this aspect. 
The United States has often been criticized for its approach to the establishment of the PSI 
framework. It was said to be outside the existing international conventions and that the PSI 
was an example of the United States using its power and influence to achieve the coalitions 
it wants.136 In my opinion, such an undifferentiated critique is not appropriate. As seen in 
my discussion, most of the PSI interdiction principles are consistent with UNCLOS. 
3.3 Risk factor: ports  
Why are ports at risk of being exposed to maritime terrorism? Millions of people work in 
ports. There are not only those who work in port areas but also all the non-port workers 
who deliver goods and services to ports or have access to ports for other reasons linked to 
ship and port operations. The security of people working in ports and terminals, including 
service providers to ports and ships, is of primary importance in the prevention of maritime 
terrorism137, because ports are the lynchpins of maritime security. Ports are widely 
accessible by land and sea and their infrastructures are often interlinked with these of the 
neighbouring countries.138 The interdependence of the world’s economy today and the 
“just-in-time” inventory system have created a situation in which a terrorist act in a port 
could trigger a chain reaction which has an impact on the whole global economy.139 
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In the following I would like to present the current regulations governing port security: The 
new SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS-Code contain several security measures which port 
facilities must comply with. According to Regulation 10 Chapter XI-2 SOLAS, port 
facilities have to take into account the guidance given in Part B ISPS Code and 
governments have to ensure that the port security measures are carried out. There are three 
security levels and for each level certain security measures are to be implemented (Section 
14 ISPS Code). The most important of these new ISPS port security measures are: Port 
Facility Security Assessment (PFSA), Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) and Port Facility 
Security Officer (PFSO).  
3.3.1 Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) 
Section 15 ISPS Code regulates the PFSA. Each contracting government has to make sure 
that the PFSA is carried out for each port facility within its territory that serves ships 
engaged in international voyages. The PFSA is a risk analysis of all aspects of a port’s 
facility operation. The aim of this analysis is to determine which parts of the port facility 
are vulnerable and therefore likely to be subject to an attack.140  
3.3.2 Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) 
The PFSP (Section 16 ISPS Code) is developed by the governments in whose territory the 
port facility is located (Reg. 3.2. SOLAS XI-2) on the basis of the PFSA. The main concern 
of the PFSP is to exclude unwarranted persons and undesirable objects from the port 
facility. The plan has to indicate the operational and physical security measures which the 
port facility needs to take to always operate at security level 1. The plan should also 
indicate additional security measures that need to be taken to operate at security level 2 or 
3.141 If a vessel is operating, for example, at security level 1 and wants to enter a port 
operating at a higher security level it needs to have security measures that comply with the 
(higher) security level (Regulation 4.3. SOLAS XI-2). 
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3.3.3 Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) 
According to Section 17 ISPS Code each port facility must designate a PFSO. The duties 
and responsibilities of the PFSO are mentioned in Section 17.2. ISPS Code. He will also 
receive training taking into account the guidance given in Part B of the ISPS Code (Section 
18 ISPS Code). 
3.4 Risk factor: containers 
Approximately 12-15 million containers are used in global trade, and 232 million container 
movements are made through ports worldwide each year.142 Terrorists could use these 
containers to transport weapons, material or personnel (see the Gioia Tauro incident, above 
p. 13) or as a means to commit an attack. Most analysts agree that the scenario of terrorists 
committing an attack with the help of containers is most likely because the international 
trading system is deliberately designed to be as open and as accessible as possible. Less 
than 5% of the containers shipped worldwide are inspected at their port of arrival.143 Purely 
from a statistical point of view there is thus a high probability that a container that has 
been tampered with will not be found.144 It is like “finding the […] needle in the container 
haystack”.145 Every time the unit is re-loaded it should be checked that the seal is not 
broken.146 In addition, the locks used to seal the containers are often only of a rudimentary 
nature.147And as soon as the container has reached the high seas, an inspection by a state 
other than the flag state is legally impossible or at least legally controversial (see above on 
p. 26 seqq.).  
In addition, container shipping involves many different actors: the exporter, the importer, 
freight forwarder, customs broker, excise inspectors, truckers, railroad workers, dock 
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workers, and the crews of the vessels themselves.148 The diversity of all procedures 
incorporating all these involved persons presents different windows of opportunity for 
terrorists to infiltrate containers. 
There are several legal regulations governing container security. I will present the SAFE 
framework and the CSI in the following. 
3.4.1 SAFE Framework 
Since the SOLAS Convention is only concerned with the safety of life at sea, but most of 
the security-sensitive parts of cargo operation take place on land, other means of addressing 
the question of cargo and container security needed to be found. Therefore, the 2002 
SOLAS Conference passed resolutions to enhance security in co-operation with the ILO 
and WCO.149 The WCO was regarded as being the appropriate platform for this because it 
has the membership and thus the participation of customs administrations representing 99% 
of global trade.150 The Resolution on Supply Chain Security and Trade Facilitation which 
addressed the protection of the international trade supply chain from acts of (maritime) 
terrorism was adopted. Since this resolution several measures have been established:151 a 
WCO list of 27 essential data elements for the identification of high-risk consignments, 
Customs Guidelines for Advance Cargo Information to enable the advance (pre-arrival) 
electronic transmission of customs data, WCO High Level Guidelines for Co-operative 
Arrangements between Members and Private Industry to Increase Supply Chain Security, a 
new International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters to 
assist Members in developing a legal basis to enable the advance electronic transmission of 
customs data. In June 2005 the WCO adopted the Framework of Standards to Secure and 
Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE Framework) which is based on two pillars with international 
standards for both customs administrations and the business community. It was described 
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as the “beginning of a new approach to working methods and partnerships for both customs 
and business”.152 
3.4.2 CSI 
The CSI is a precautionary multinational programme protecting containerized shipping 
from being exploited or disrupted by international terrorists. It was developed by US 
Customs, now the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in the aftermath of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.153 Since it may be too late and therefore of little 
value to inspect cargo at the port of destination this should be already done at the port of 
departure.154 The United States called this procedure an “extension of the borders”, because 
the physical borders are now the last line of defence and not the first.155  
Singapore was the first country to sign this agreement with the United States. In October 
2007 the CSI was operational in more than 50 ports in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle 
East and America.156 Most of the operating ports are in Europe and Asia. 
The CSI is based on four core elements: firstly, identifying the high-risk containers, 
secondly, screening containers as early in the supply chain as possible (i.e. generally at the 
port of departure), thirdly, using technology that makes it possible to screen the containers 
so rapidly that screening does not slow down the movement of trade and, finally, using 
tamper-proof containers which will allow customs officers at the ports of arrival to identify 
manipulated containers. 
The CSI is reciprocal and offers participating countries the opportunity to send their 
customs officers to major US ports to target ocean-going, containerized cargo to be 
exported to their countries.157 The US CBP is willing to assist foreign governments in 
reviewing existing laws and crafting new legislation to support implementation if they so 
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desire.158 Even though many countries are of the opinion that the container security 
approach is exaggerated, they have no other option than to co-operate with the United 
States if they do not want to lose the right to enter US ports.159 So in my opinion we could 
call the CSI a de facto international approach.  
The CSI has often been subject to criticism: It was said that US unilateralism wants to 
protect the United States by pushing the risk to foreign ports and that it would have been 
better to regulate the issue of container security internationally.160 However, given the fact 
that most major seaports have joined the CSI, one must in my opinion say that the CSI has 
been a success. 
3.5 Risk factor: crews  
A large number of people are employed on vessels or work with cargo. International 
merchant fleets comprise 1,227,000 officers and seamen from many different countries.161 
And every year thousands sail with falsified documents, which poses enormous security 
risks.162  
There are four main concerns about maritime security concerning the risk factor “crews” 
which I will present and discuss in the following: First the seafarers’ identity documents 
are often too easy to falsify, second there are insufficient background checks and the 
identity systems for seafarers in many developing countries are not secure. There are also 
concerns about screening of personnel, which is often not very stringent. The fourth major 
security concern is about the shore leave of the ships’ crew.  
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3.5.1 Identification 
Main concerns have often been about the seafarers identity documents and background 
checks and it was necessary to seek compromises between the parties involved when 
drafting new regulations. Many concerns were resolved in 2002 by the adoption of a 
resolution (Conference resolution 8: Enhancement of security in co-operation with the 
International Labour Organization) requesting the IMO to co-operate with the ILO in the 
development of a seafarer’s document covering all the relevant data.163 In June 2003 The 
Seafarers Identity Documents Convention (2003, revised) was issued and became effective 
as from February 9, 2005. By 22 July, 2008 the Convention had been ratified by 13 
countries.164 The revised Convention introduces a viable system for meeting contemporary 
security concerns while maintaining the necessary facilitation of shipping and recognition 
of the needs of seafarers at the same time.165 Each member state issues each of its seafaring 
nationals with an identity document embodying at least one security feature such as 
watermarks, ultraviolet features, holograms or laser engraving. This new identification 
system requires the maintenance of a national database but also international oversight.166 
In March 2004 the ILO adopted a new “biometric” template for turning two seafarer’s 
fingerprints into an internationally standardized barcode. This will enable biometric 
identification of seafarers worldwide.167 Also the PFSP as described in the ISPS Code 
should contain procedures for the verification of identity documents.168  
3.5.2 Background checks 
A major problem concerning background checks is how to get reliable information about 
the crew early enough to intervene before the vessel is in port. Ships approaching the 
United States are requested to communicate details about passengers, cargo, destination but 
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also about the crew in advance. Under the 96-hour rule of arrival, ships wishing to enter 
US ports have to provide 96 hours prior notice of arrival to the US Coast Guard and to 
provide it with certain information. This notice must include a list of all those on board 
(crew and passengers) with date of birth, nationality and passport number.169  
There are also several regulations in international law concerning providing the port of call 
with information: According to Regulation 5 Chapter XI-2 SOLAS the company (i.e. the 
ship owning company as defined in Chapter IX Regulation 1.1. SOLAS) must ensure that 
the master has available on board at all times information on who is responsible for 
appointing the members of the crew or persons currently employed or engaged on the ship. 
However, according to Regulation 9.2.1.6 Chapter XI-2 SOLAS ships intending to enter a 
port of another contracting government may be required by the ports which they want to 
call at to provide “other practical security related information”. 4.39.4 ISPS Code Part B 
(guidance) further describes what kind of information this is supposed to be. Such other 
practical information that may be required in the port is, for example, a crew list.170  
The FAL Convention also contains some provisions on requirements made of documents 
(such as a crew list) by public authorities on arrival or on departure (Annex Section 2 
A.). According to this convention it is recommended practice that public authorities should 
not require the crew list to include more information than the name and nationality of the 
ship, the crew member’s family name, given names, nationality, rank or rating, date and 
place of birth, nature and number of identity document, port and date of arrival and where 
the crew member arrived from (section 2.6.1.). 
3.5.3 Screening of personnel 
The frequency of screening of personnel generally depends on which security level 
(according to the ISPS Code) is applicable. Whereas security level 1 includes only random 
screening of personnel, the frequency of screening in level 2 is increased and the access 
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and movement control measures more stringent. Level 3 measures may include 100 per 
cent screening as well as increased identification checks.171 
3.5.4 Shore leave  
A very controversial issue on maritime security concerning the crew is shore leave. Shore 
leave is defined in Annex Section 2 A. of the FAL Convention as the permission for a crew 
member to be ashore during the ship’s stay in port within such geographical or time limits, 
if any, as may be decided by the public authorities. 
Such a right to shore leave existed for merchant sailors in customary law long before it 
appeared in the earliest written maritime codes of the Middle Ages.172 However, the right 
to shore leave is not an absolute right. A very controversial matter is in what way the shore 
leave of the vessel’s crew is to be restricted nowadays. This is because of the conflicts 
between security and human rights which arise under that issue. There must be a proper 
balance between the needs of security, the protection of the human rights of the seafarers 
and working efficiency on the ship.173 The preamble to the ISPS Code (under No. 10) 
clearly states that ISPS is not to be interpreted in a way that is inconsistent with existing 
international law that protects the rights and freedoms of seafarers. If there is no reason 
(such as public health, public safety or public order) for refusing to grant a shore leave 
permission, foreign crew members shall be allowed to shore leave according to the FAL 
Convention (see the Preamble of the ISPS Code No 11). On World Maritime Day 2004, 
shore leave was spotlighted and it was pointed out that shore leave in foreign ports is 
important to ensure the seafarers’ wellbeing and welfare.174  
According to section 16.3.15 ISPS Code/Part A and 16.8.14 ISPS Code/Part B the PFSP 
too must address procedures for facilitating shore leave for ship’s personnel or personnel 
changes. However, certain governments, such as that of the United States, have placed 
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tighter restrictions than those which are provided for under international law on the shore 
leave of seafarers: Not only has shore leave frequently been denied but some companies 
been have also been required to hire armed guards to prevent foreign seafarers from leaving 
their ships. Despite the principle established under international law that seafarers should 
not be required to obtain visas in order to enjoy shore leave when they can present the new 
ID (according to the International Labour Organization Seafarers’ Identity Documents 
Convention, revised 2003), the United States requests individual visas for entry to US 
ports.175  
The FAL Convention contains regulations governing shore leave. The last amendments 
which entered into force 1 November 2006 include a recommended practice for public 
authorities to develop the necessary procedures in order to use pre-arrival and pre-departure 
information to facilitate the processing of information and thus expedite and release 
clearance of cargo and persons. As a starting point crew members will not be required to 
have a special permit, for example, a shore leave pass, for the purpose of shore leave 
(Annex A 3.19.3.). Requiring a visa for shore leave is also specifically prohibited (3.45). It 
is recommended practice that public authorities should normally not require the 
presentation of individual identity documents or of information supplementing the 
seafarer’s identity document in respect of members of the crew other than that given on the 
crew list (3.10.3). 3.19 states that foreign crew members are to be allowed ashore by the 
public authorities while the ship on which they arrive is in port. Permission to come ashore 
can only be refused by the public authorities for reasons of public health, public safety or 
public order. 
The International Labor Organization’s Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention 
(Revised), 2003 (ILO-185), which has not yet come into force and has not yet been ratified 
by the United States, reaffirms the seafarers’ right to shore leave in its preamble: Since the 
seafarers work and live on the vessels, shore leave is a vital element for the seafarer’s 
wellbeing. According to Art. 6 seafarers are not to be required to hold a visa for the 
purpose of shore leave. Shore leave might be restricted by port authorities because of 
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public health, public safety, public order or national security (Article 6.5.). Similarly, the 
draft Consolidated Maritime Labour Convention (which is supposed to be a consolidation 
of all maritime labour standards when the consolidation process is finished) affirms the 
seafarers right to shore leave in Regulation 2.4.176  
3.6 Risk factor: passengers  
Several security measures prevent passengers from being harmed by a terrorist attack. 
However, passengers themselves could also constitute a threat. What legal regime do we 
have to prevent a terrorist attack being committed by someone who has entered a vessel as 
a legitimate passenger? Is there a difference with regard to passenger ferries and cruise 
ships? I would like to answer this question by first analyzing the risk factor “passengers” 
for cruise ships and ferries and then presenting the legal regime. 
3.6.1 Cruise ships 
Every year millions of people from countries all over the world go on a cruise. The Queen 
Mary 2, for instance, carries up to 3900 passengers and crew members.177 Cruise ships have 
been targets for terrorism in the past (see e.g. the Achille Lauro attack). It was reported that 
on June 15, 2008 the British Foreign Intelligence Service (MI6) uncovered a plot by Al-
Qaeda to attack cruise ships in the Caribbean and jihadist websites state that Al-Qaeda 
plans to infiltrate terrorists with fake identities to work on cruise ships.178 Maritime 
terrorists are interested in cruise ships for several reasons, including the following: cruise 
ships carry a large number of people from different countries who are confined to a single 
space, they are of a highly iconic nature and reflect a type of Western materialism.179 
Moreover, such an attack on a highly symbolic target could cause billions of dollars in 
economic damage and attract considerable media attention.180 Cruise ships sail according to 
precise schedules which are readily available on the internet or in brochures. These are 
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extremely valuable sources of intelligence for maritime terrorists.181 Whereas some cruise 
ship companies require all boarding passengers to pass through a metal detector and x-ray 
all carry-on luggage, many companies do not do so.182 
3.6.2 Ferries 
Ferries are certainly a target which is not as iconic or prestigious as cruise ships, nor do 
they constitute the same type of high economic value as is associated with container 
shipping. However, several traits inherent to passenger ferries make them extremely 
attractive to terrorists: they are easy to access, they have the potential to kill many people 
and are therefore likely to capture significant media attention. Ro-ro (roll on, roll off) 
ferries in particular allow for rapid loading of cars, tourist coaches, busses, mini vans and 
freight trucks.183 
Perhaps the best example of the positive cost-benefit ratio association in a terrorist’s view 
was the SuperFerry 14 which was bombed in 2004 (see above p. 12). Although costing 
only between $300 and $400, the attack killed 116 and injured more than 300 people.184  
Despite greater interest among analysts in the possibility of an attack on a cruise ship, 
many say that open-access ferries are probably the most likely targets for mass casualty 
attacks, possibly including hostage-taking at sea.185 Since these ferries are easily accessible, 
terrorists can enter the ferries as legitimate passengers and bring their material on board in 
luggage or even in vehicles (e.g. the SuperFerry 14 and City of Poros incidents, see above 
p. 11 seq.).  
Security measures carried out at ferry passenger terminals vary greatly: Even in states like 
the Netherlands, Canada, the UK and the USA, these measures are not nearly as extensive 
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as those employed for cruise liners and much less extensive than those applied in 
commercial aviation.186 
3.6.3 Legal regime concerning the risk factor “passengers” 
To prevent terrorists entering ships as legitimate passengers and bringing material on board 
to commit an attack, the following measures are most important: identity and background 
checks and screening of all persons and their luggage before they enter the ship. The most 
important legal sources regulating these measures are the ISPS Code and the FAL 
Convention. 
The ISPS Code is applicable to all kinds of passenger vessels (Regulation 2.1.1.1.). The 
frequency of such security checks generally depends on which security level in the ISPS 
Code is applicable, and the quality and quantity of checks carried out will be dependent on 
the security level of the vessel and of the port facility. Whereas security level 1 includes 
only random screening of personnel, the frequency of screening is increased in level 2 and 
access and movement control measures are more stringent. Level 3 measures may include 
100 per cent screening as well as increased identity checks.187  
According to Regulation 9.2.1.6 Chapter XI-2 SOLAS, ships intending to enter a port of 
another contracting government may be required by the ports at which they want to call to 
provide “other practical security related information” and regulation 4.39.6 ISPS Code Part 
B (guidance) mentions that this information can contain a passenger list.  
However, the tools of the ISPS Code are not applied to all shipping in the same way. 
Alternative security agreements are allowed in the ferry sector for short voyages on fixed 
routes between port facilities in the territory of countries that are parties to the agreement 
(Annex B 4.26). These alternatives must be true alternatives, that is they must meet the 
same standard as the ISPS Code.188 Alternatives measures were allowed for because the 
regular ISPS rules are said to interfere too much with the loading and discharging process. 
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The second reason for allowing alternative measures was that all measures have to be 
coordinated between the maritime administrations at both ends of the ferries itinerary.  
The FAL Convention (Annex Section 2 A and B) also provides for the possibility of public 
authorities requesting a passenger list on arrival or on departure to obtain the information 
referred to in Art. 2.7.3. However, it is recommended practice that public authorities should 
not require passenger lists on short routes between neighbouring countries (2.7.1). There 
are less stringent security regulations for passengers in transit who do not leave the vessel 
(3.36.-3.42).  
The Convention also contains one chapter which is solely applicable to cruise ships and 
cruise passengers: For cruise ships the passenger list will be required only at the first port 
of arrival and final port of departure in a country provided that there has been no change in 
the circumstances of the voyage (3.21).  
4 Conclusion 
In my opinion, no general answer can be given to the question “Is today’s maritime 
security sufficient?”. For a long time maritime security did not receive as much attention 
internationally as it should have. Now the days of little maritime security have passed.189 
Much progress has been made – particularly after 9/11. However, today’s legal regime on 
maritime security has not only strengths, but also some flaws. 
First of all I would appreciate if states found a definition of “maritime terrorism” they 
could agree on. Second I must say that I am not of the opinion that the premise “security is 
a matter of prioritizing and balancing risks”190 and the resulting three security levels is an 
appropriate basis for regulating maritime security. Pursuant to the new SOLAS XI-2 and 
ISPS Code regime we have many new possibilities for creating a good standard of 
maritime security concerning particularly vessel and port security. However, the quality 
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and quantity of preventive security measures depends significantly on the currently 
applicable security level. This concept of security levels entails a grave problem. Of course 
we can never eliminate a risk completely. However, we can never be certain whether the 
evaluation of the applicable security has come to the right conclusion. Therefore, it might 
be the case that we operate on security level 1 on a certain vessel, but then a massive 
terrorist attack is carried out which could have been prevented with security measures from 
a higher security level. In other words: Why is every passenger checked for his identity, has 
to pass trough a metal detector and every single bag is screened at an airport before he is 
allowed to board the plane, whereas at a port or on a vessel the same quantity and quality of 
measures only takes place if a high security level applies? In conclusion, I must say that 
nowadays it seems easier to attack a ship or a coastal city than an aeroplane.191 I hope this 
will not result in an increasing number of maritime terrorist attacks. 
One might say that it is not possible to always operate on a higher security level in the 
maritime sector because this would cost too much and all the security checks would take 
too much time, so that the whole flow of the trade system would be delayed.192 But one 
could also pose the question of why these strict security measures are nevertheless applied 
in air traffic where you could put forward the same line of argumentation (costs and delay). 
Back in 1986 several regulations on maritime security measures were demanded which 
have not yet been drafted: for example always checking all the passengers’ luggage, 
checking all the vehicles which passengers are travelling on (after all their luggage has 
been removed from the vehicle) and checking that all passengers have returned from transit 
before sailing return.193 I hope that regulations on maritime security will be improved 
before a disaster of similar proportions to the 9/11 incidents occurs in the maritime world.  
Concerning the risk factor “passengers” I am of the opinion that we need more stringent 
regulations. Since cruise liners and ferries must allow passengers to move freely, security 
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improvements should focus on developing more stringent and effective means for 
screening passengers, crew and luggage. 
Concerning the risk factor “containers” every country would probably prefer to have an 
international treaty regulating this issue rather than bilateral agreements like the CSI. 
However, I must say that nowadays if we want to improve maritime security as soon and as 
effectively as possible, bilateral agreements might be the better way to resolve the problem. 
Most of the major seaports have joined the CSI. So one might conclude that the fear of 
losing the United States as a major trading partner if one does not sign the bilateral 
agreement might be more of an incentive than ratifying an international treaty. Since the 
introduction of the CSI more containers are being screened than ever before. So it can be 
seen as a success. However, I also would prefer it if every container were screened before 
being shipped. Of course, this will cost both time and money, but the improvement to 
maritime security should be worth it. 
Concerning the issue of the boarding of vessels I would appreciate if there were a 
regulation that states clearly under which exact circumstances a vessel may be boarded and 
inspected. Determining which circumstances are sufficient to board a vessel should not be 
dependent on the flag state’s consent. The new draft of Art. 8 bis SUA is a step in the right 
direction, but is no more than that, because boarding remains dependent on the permission 
of the flag state. Several scholars have criticized the United States’ PSI approach as being 
inappropriate and said it should rather be regulated in an international treaty. In my opinion 
the PSI should not be criticised for that reason. The PSI is a step in the right direction, 
because it helps to improve maritime security effectively. And bilateral agreements might 
nowadays be a better alternative to regulating the issue in an international treaty.  
Pertaining to the risk factor “crews” I really welcome the development of a uniform 
seafarer’s document containing all relevant data. It makes it possible to tighten maritime 
security without being a hindrance to trade. Shore leave should in my opinion be allowed 
without the need to obtain a visa, because there are other ways to safeguard potential 
terrorists from leaving a vessel to enter a country (e.g. identity and background checks 
when the crew lists are sent in advance or when the crew leaves the vessel). 
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Important steps have been taken, but there is still a long way to go before security measures 
in the shipping industry match security in other sectors. More steps should be taken down 
this road as soon as possible. 
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